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Abstract 
The IRR (dollar-weighted return) reflects the periodic addition or withdrawal of funds by investors, 
and the difference between IRR and geometric mean is widely used to indicate the impact that the 
timing of these flows has had on investor returns. This is a biased measure, since it is also affected 
by investment flows which “chase” previous strong returns. A method has previously been derived 
for separating this bias from genuine timing effects. This paper demonstrates that using in-sample 
mean returns for this decomposition causes an additional bias which again misleadingly suggests 
bad investor timing. This paper quantifies this bias, allowing unbiased investor timing effects to be 
estimated. A proper understanding of these biases is of significant practical importance, since 
investors are often presented with biased timing indicators based on IRRs. 
JEL Classification: G11  





*Cass Business School, 106 Bunhill Row, London EC1Y 8TZ, UK.       
E-mail: simon.hayley.1@city.ac.uk. Tel +44 20 7040 0230.  I am very grateful for comments from Ian 
Marsh, Richard Payne, Tim Perkins and participants at a seminar at Cass Business School. The usual 
disclaimer applies  
1 
 
Further Biases in Using Dollar-Weighted Returns to Infer 
Investment Timing Effects 
 
1. Introduction 
 The internal rate of return (IRR) reflects the timing of investment flows. As a result, it is widely 
argued that the “performance gap” between the IRR and geometric mean (GM) return measures 
the extent to which bad timing of these flows affects returns. Using this method a large number of 
papers have concluded that the bad timing of investments into the equity market has substantially 
reduced the overall return to the average investor (Dichev (2007), Friesen & Sapp (2007), Dichev 
and Yu (2011), Chieh-Tse Hou  (2012),  Muňoz (2015), Navone and Pagani (2015), Cornell et al. 
(2016)). 
This method has been shown to be biased. Hayley (2014) demonstrated that the IRR can be 
affected by investment flows after a period of unusually high or low returns just as much as it can 
be affected by investment flows before this period. Indeed, there is a strong case for expecting the 
first effect (the “hindsight effect”) to have a significant negative impact on IRRs, since there is 
ample evidence that investors “chase returns” by investing more following periods of high returns 
(e.g Siri and Tufano (1998), Phillips et al. (2012)).  
Hayley (2014) also derived a method for decomposing the performance gap into the hindsight 
effect and genuine timing effects. The results of this decomposition were sensitive to the initial 
assumption chosen for the mean return, but over a range of different assumptions, the observed 
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negative performance gap in US equities could be explained by the hindsight effect, with any 
timing effect close to zero. 
Despite this, subsequent research has continued to interpret the performance gap between 
IRRs and GM returns as an indicator of bad timing (e.g. Muňoz (2015), Navone and Pagani (2015), 
Cornell et al. (2017)). Commercial databases such as Morningstar continue to publish mutual fund 
IRRs in addition to their GM returns. 
Vicente and Muňoz (2018) uses an approach based on Hayley (2014) to decompose the 
performance gaps on US mutual funds (1990-2016) and finds that although the majority of the 
performance gap can be attributed to the hindsight effect, there still appears to be significant 
genuine bad timing of investment flows into all the major categories of mutual fund (e.g. a 
“corrected” timing effect of 0.71% out of a total performance gap of 1.80% for all US domestic 
equity mutual funds). However, these decompositions were derived by initially assuming for each 
fund that the return in each period is equal to the GM return observed for that fund over the entire 
investment period. It is demonstrated below that this assumption consistently biases the 
decomposition.  
The intuition behind this additional bias is that using the sample mean implies that above-
average returns prior to any given period must by construction be followed by subsequent below-
average returns. Given that return-chasing by investors leads to additional investment inflows 
following periods with above-average returns, these inflows will by construction come ahead of 
periods of below-average returns. This is an entirely spurious correlation. It will tend to push the 
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DWRR below the GM return, and this is likely to be misinterpreted as evidence that investors timed 
their investment flows badly. 
Section 3 (below) derives an expression for the expected size of this bias. This is close to the 
size of the timing effects claimed by Vicente and Muňoz (2018), suggesting that their results are 
not evidence of consistent bad timing by investors. More importantly, identifying and quantifying 
this bias offers a methodological improvement which will allow unbiased estimates of any genuine 
timing effects to be estimated. A proper understanding of these biases is of significant practical 
importance, since investors are often presented with biased timing indicators based on IRRs.  
2. Approximating the Hindsight Effect in the IRR 
The IRR is usually defined as the discount rate that sets the NPV of investment cashflows to zero:  
	∑ 0    (1) 
where Kt is the portfolio value at the end of period t, and at is the flow of new cash invested into 
this portfolio each period. This flow could be positive or negative, and is assumed to take place at 
the end of each period.1 Remaining assets KT are treated as if liquidated in the final period. 
                                                     
1 Hayley (2014) shows that shifting to assuming that flows come at the start of each month has negligible 




The change in portfolio value each period is a function of the return rt on the portfolio 
during this period and any additional cash at invested: Kt=Kt-1(1+rt)+at. Substituting this 
relationship into equation (1) and rearranging shows that the IRR can also be expressed as a 
weighted average of the individual period returns rt, where the weight used is determined by the 
present value of the investment at the start of each period (see Dichev and Yu, 2011). Hence the 
IRR is also referred to as the dollar-weighted rate of return: 
	 ∑ ∑     (2) 
The IRR is a complex polynomial function of the periodic returns rt over the course of the 
investment horizon. This complexity means that approximations are generally required in order to 
derive useful analytic results. The simulations presented later in this paper allow us to assess the 
accuracy of these assumptions. We assume that the returns rt are serially independent, which can 
be interpreted as weak form market efficiency. If inflows and outflows after period 0 and the 
standard deviation of rt are all fairly small, Kt-1 grows at an approximately uniform rate which is 
roughly equal to the IRR, implying that each rt will be given an approximately equal weight in the 
IRR calculation, so the IRR will be close to the mean: 
	 ∑       (3) 
From this simple starting condition, we introduce a single investment inflow a at the end of 
period n (a is expressed here as a percentage of the portfolio value at that time, and a negative a 
indicates an outflow as investors withdraw funds). This inflow increases Kt in all subsequent 
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periods in the investment horizon. Instead of all weights being 1/T, the weights given to rt will now 
be approximately as shown in equation 4: 
	 ∑ ∑     (4) 
∑ ∑   (5) 
Prior research has suggested that the cash inflow a is strongly related to the immediately 
preceding return (Sirri/Tufano (1998), and Phillips et al. (2012)). This is commonly referred to as 
“return chasing” by investors, and is presumed to be due to strong returns in one period resulting 
in investors becoming more optimistic about future returns. For simplicity we assume that a is a 
function of rn, but not of earlier returns. This, and the serial independence of the returns, means 
that the summations in equation (5) have no correlation with their multiplicands, and so have 
expected value μ in each period. Only rn is correlated with a in the denominator, thus: 
E 	 	 E     (6) 
μ E       (7) 
For small a, 	  and we approximate using 1/(1+x)≈1-x for small x: 
E 	 2 n 1 a T n 	 																		 (8) 
Assuming the relationship between flows and returns to be linear (a= w(rn-μ), where w is a 
constant), and noting that E[rn-μ]=0, E[(rn-μ)2]=σ2: 
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	 																			                                         (9)  
The derivation above shows how the hindsight effect identified in Hayley (2014) affects 
the performance gap (IRR-μ). Return-chasing by investors leads to a significant investment inflow 
after an above-average return rn in the immediately preceding period. Thus the numerator (rn-μ) in 
equation (7) is positively correlated with the denominator. For example, a high return rn would 
generate a positive investment inflow a which increases the relative weight given to future 
investment returns. But the weights given to all the periods in our investment horizon must sum to 
one, so this inflow a also reduces the weight given to prior returns, including rn. Conversely, a 
below-average return rn leads to an outflow of funds which reduces the weight given to future 
returns and increases the relative weight given to rn. Thus above-average returns are given a 
reduced weight, and below-average returns an increased weight, consistently reducing the IRR.  
It would be a mistake to interpret this as bad investment timing – it does not have any effect 
on investors’ expected terminal wealth since it is a retrospective adjustment of the relative weights 
in the IRR calculation after the period has passed because inflows tend to be correlated with past 
returns. Instead, genuine timing effects need to adjust investors’ exposures before the return 
concerned (i.e. inflows correlated with future returns). 
Equation (9) gives us the effect on the IRR from a specific investment flow immediately 
after period n. In order to generate the total effect on the IRR, we sum this effect over each specific 
period from n=1 to T, giving us a result equivalent to that in Perkins (2018): 
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	 																							                              (10) 
For large T, this approximates to 	so this bias is not a small sample effect. The impact 
that each individual rt has on the IRR declines with T as it becomes a smaller part of the sample. 
But the total effect on the IRR is then the sum of a correspondingly increased number of such 
individual effects.2 
The above derivation considered the effect of each individual flow a in isolation, ignoring 
any interaction between the effects of flows in different periods. Given the underlying assumptions 
that returns rt are independently and identically distributed and that flows are a stable function of 
these returns, the effect of interactions between these periodic flows in the IRR calculation are 
likely to be of second order. The simulations (Table 1, below) confirm that equation (10) is an 
adequate approximation for investment horizons in the range used by Vicente and Muňoz  (2018). 
                                                     
2 Equation (10) gives an estimate of the performance gap as normally defined: IRR-geometric mean (GM). This may 
seem contradicted by the fact that μ was defined as the expected periodic return E[rt], i.e. the arithmetic mean return. 
However, there is another effect at work even if there are no periodic cashflows (at=0): an above-average rt increases 
the portfolio value Kt, increasing the relative weight given in the IRR calculation to subsequent returns, and hence 
reducing the relative weight given to rt itself (a below-average rt will correspondingly increase its own weight).  For 
simplicity suppose that rt=μ for all t, except for rn>μ. The weight given to rt in the IRR calculation is a function of the 
present value of Kt-1. The value of Kt-1 is unaffected by rt, but the discount rate will have increased (by around 	 , 
as a first approximation), reducing the present value by approximately 	
/
. The weights given to r1 
through rn-1 will also have been reduced, but the weights for rn+1 through rT will have been increased because of the 
increased portfolio values Kt to KT. If the rt are serially independent then the only systematic effect will be that each 
large rt reduces its own weight in the IRR calculation (and vice versa). Taking a Taylor expansion of the 
/
term, taking expectations and averaging over all t gives μ	 , i.e. even before introducing any 
intermediate cashflows at, the expected value of the IRR is the GM, not the AM. Equation (10) shows the additional 




Equation (10) gives us an expression for the expected size of the theoretical performance 
gap  when investment flows chase returns (according to an=w(rn-1-μ)).We might be 
concerned that in practice because μ is not known, the empirical performance gap ̅ 	is used, 
which compares the IRR to the sample mean. However, whilst equation (7) requires the existence 
of a well-defined distribution mean μ, it does not require us to know its value. Our corresponding 
estimate of  as the sample mean would inevitably include some noise, but it is unbiased, so the 
expected value of the empirical performance gap	 ̅  is the same as our expression for the 
true gap in equation (10). By contrast, the following section shows that using the sample mean 
results in a substantial bias in the decomposition of this gap into an estimated hindsight effect and 
genuine timing effect. 
3.  Decomposing the Performance Gap Using the Sample Mean Return 
This section investigates whether using the sample mean rather than the true mean μ affects the 
decomposition of ̅  into timing and hindsight effects. For this purpose, we again assume 
a set of serially uncorrelated returns rt. These can be thought of as generated by a pure random 
walk process, removing the possibility of consistently good or bad timing. We then derive an 
expression for the size of the timing effect that we would estimate when we decompose this 
performance gap. 
The decomposition process derived by Hayley (2014) works by initially setting all periodic 
returns rt equal to an assumed mean μ, and all periodic flows at to zero. At this point the IRR for 
this investment will by construction be equal to μ. The first observed return r1 is then substituted 
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in, and the IRR recalculated. Then the first observed investment inflow a1 is substituted in, and the 
IRR again recalculated. These substitutions are repeated for each successive period. Following all 
these substitutions, all actual data are in place, so the final calculation gives the IRR observed in 
the actual data. Because these substitutions are made in chronological order, substituting in the 
returns has a non-zero net effect on the IRR to the extent that each rt is correlated with prior 
investment flows (this represents genuine good/bad timing of these flows which will affect investor 
wealth). By contrast, substituting in the flows at affects the IRR to the extent that the flows at are 
correlated with prior returns the hindsight effect). 
We derived equation (10), giving the expected total performance gap, by initially 
considering each flow at in isolation. By contrast, now that we are estimating the apparent “timing 
effect” we need explicitly to include the investment flows prior to period t in order to estimate the 
degree to which these are correlated with subsequent returns. We continue to assume that each 
inflow (measured as a percentage of the fund’s size at the time) is . 
We will first consider what happens when we substitute in a single rn. We then repeat this 
process for n=1 to T to generate an aggregate overall effect for 1≤n≤T, replicating the process by 
which the total timing effect is estimated. As above, the IRR calculation immediately before 
substituting in rn gives a relative weight to each of the prior returns r1 to rn-1 which depends on the 
cumulative investment inflows ahead of each period (a0 is normalised to zero, and we set the initial 
portfolio value K0=1). All future returns rn to rT are given an equal relative weight determined by 
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the cumulative inflows so far (1 ∑ ), with these future returns at this stage all assumed 
equal to μ: 
IRR	
∑ ∑ 	 ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ 	 ∑
            (11) 
From this starting point we now substitute in the actual value of rn: 
IRR	
∑ ∑ 	 	 ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ 	 ∑
    (12) 
The denominator does not change, since we have not yet substituted in at, so the change in 
IRR resulting from substituting in rn is the difference between equations 11 and 12: 
	
∑ 	
∑ ∑ 	 ∑
    (13) 
E[dIRR] in equation 13 is zero, since (rn-μ) is independent of prior at and E[rn-μ]=0. This 
correctly reflects the fact that if the rt follow a random walk, and hence are genuinely 
unforecastable, then we should expect no timing effect. But in practice we do not know μ with 
certainty. Hayley (2014) responded to this by considering a range of different values for μ. Vicente 
and Muňoz  (2018) instead estimate the timing and hindsight effects for different US funds just by 
initially setting all rt equal to the observed mean return ̅, giving: 
	
∑ ̅ 	
∑ ∑ 	 ∑
    (14) 
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This means that E[dIRR] is no longer zero, since r r̅  is correlated with ∑ , 
since at=w(rt-μ). Approximating, using 1/(1+x)≈1-x and noting that the denominator is 



















	 T n 1
r r̅
T
	 T n 1 														 17  
The first term is simply the increase in the recorded mean at this stage in the decomposition 
as a result of substituting in the actual value of rn in place of ̅. This has an expected value of zero. 
Recalling that , the last term is a collection of third order terms in the deviation of 
rt from either the sample mean or the true mean. The expected value of these third order terms is 
likely to be small, and we omit them to focusing instead on the second-order terms. The second 
term has expectation: 
∑ ∑ 	 n 1 ∑       (18)  
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∑ ∑ r r̅ r 	 n 1 ∑ r r̅ r   (19) 
w
T
r r r̅r r̅μ r 	 – n 1 r r r̅r r̅μ r  
Recalling that E r E r̅ μ, and that serial independence means that  E r r μ : 
 ∑ ∑
2 1 2
	 n 1 ∑
2 1 2
	 												 20  
    (21) 
      (22) 
Summing from n=1 to T, the expected value of this estimated timing effect over the whole 
decomposition process is: 
             (23) 
Thus when substituting in the rt, there is an expected reduction in the IRR even if, as 
assumed in the derivation above, there is no correlation between successive returns or between 
flows and subsequent returns. This reduced IRR should not be interpreted as the effect of bad 
investment timing. Instead it is entirely due to the use of the sample mean return rather than the 
actual mean μ, which introduces a spurious negative autocorrelation of returns, since above-
sample-mean cumulative returns must by construction be followed on average by below-sample-
mean returns.  
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Referring to equation (14), E[ 1 ∑ ̅ 0 because even though 
̅ 0, these two components are negatively correlated because of the return-chasing 
investor behaviour which leads to a large (small) ∑  if prior returns have been above (below) 
average, and hence future returns will by construction be below (above) average. By contrast, if 
we were to use the actual mean μ, 1 ∑ 0 because the two component 
terms are independent.  
In effect, this is a form of the spurious negative autocorrelation effect identified by Kendall 
(1954). That was a small sample effect which disappears as the length of the horizon increases. In 
the derivation above, the effect of each individual return rn does indeed become negligible for large 
T (equation 22), but the total effect does not disappear when we sum over all periods (equation 23). 
Thus the effect of this spurious autocorrelation does not disappear for large horizons, implying that 
decomposting the performance gap using the sample mean is likely to result in a misleading 
negative “timing” effect of –wσ2/6 even when, as assumed in our derivation above, rt follows a 
random walk. 
One way around this is, as in Hayley (2014), to use a range of plausible alternative 
assumptions for the true mean of the return distribution. Failing this, we can use equation (23) to 
construct a ready-reckoner for the size of the likely bias, and only apparent timing effects 
significantly different from this should be construed as evidence of genuine timing effects. 
We saw earlier that the total expected effect of return-chasing on the IRR when returns 
follow a random walk is . Of this, we have found that  is likely to be falsely attributed to 
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bad timing, because of the spurious autocorrelation of	 ̅ . The remaining  will then be 
correctly attributed to the hindsight effect (as confirmed in the annex). Thus, for large T, one third 
of the recorded “performance gap” (IRR-GM) is likely to be interpreted as being due to bad timing, 
even if there is no such effect. The remaining two thirds will be correctly attributed to the hindsight 
effect caused by return chasing. 
Vicente and Muňoz (2018) found that the total performance gap of 1.80% per annum for 
all US domestic equity mutual funds decomposed into a hindsight effect of 1.09% and bad timing 
of 0.71%. They interpreted this as evidence that investment flows were indeed badly timed, 
although the scale of this effect had been substantially reduced by taking account of the hindsight 
effect. However, their decomposition was based on the assumption that the mean return for each 
fund represented the true mean of the underlying return distribution. As demonstrated above, this 
assumption introduces a bias which should be expected to lead to around one third of the 
performance gap being misclassified as bad timing. This bias would account for 0.60% of their 
0.71% estimated bad timing effect, implying very little evidence of actual bad timing. 
4. Simulation Evidence 
We made a number of approximations in the derivations above, but in this section we find that 
simulation evidence is consistent with these results.  
These simulations generated monthly returns and then the corresponding monthy 
investment inflow/outflow using . The GM and IRR returns were calculated for 
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these simulated series. The resulting performance gap (IRR-GM) was then decomposed using the 
Hayley (2014) method, but with the monthly returns always initially assumed equal to the observed 
sample GM. Where this decomposition records a significant timing effect we know that this is 
entirely spurious, since monthly returns were generated as a random walk which cannot be 
consistently timed.  
The simulations in Table 1 below were conducted using lognormal monthly returns over a 
wide range of different investment horizons. These results use w=3 to determine the size of the 
return-chasing effect in the investment flows, since this generates performance gaps of the same 
sort of magnitude as are observed in practice.3 The monthly volatility of returns rt is set to 4% to 
represent the volatility of a well diversified portfolio (annual standard deviation of 14%) and 8% 
to represent periods of exceptional volatility when the results derived above might be expected to 
be less accurate approximations.  
  
                                                     
3 Using a smaller value of w would scale down both the simulated and theoretical effects proportionately, 
leaving their comparative values unchanged. Sirri and Tuffano (1998) and Philips et al. (2012) found that 
on average the effect is roughly w≈0.3, although it can be much larger for the best performing funds. 
Darendeli (2017) also argues that the return-chasing effect can be much larger than 0.3 for some funds 
(where the appropriate return metric is included in the monthly factsheet). Our derivation above shows that 
the average bias observed will be heavily influenced by outliers, so the net effect is likely to be much larger 
than would be generated using w=0.3, so for this reason we use a much larger figure (w=3) in order to 
determine whether our mathematical derivation is acceptably accurate when we generate hindsight effects 




Table 1 – Simulations: apparent timing effects as percentage of total performance gap 
Monthly s.d. 
of returns 
 Investment horizon (years)  
 1 2 4 8 16 
4% 
Performance Gap -0.17% -0.20% -0.22% -0.23% -0.24% 
Timing (% of gap) 42.1% 37.4% 35.1% 33.5% 31.0% 
8% Performance Gap -0.71% -0.80% -0.86% -0.92% -0.95% 
Timing (% of gap) 42.1% 36.4% 34.0% 29.9% 28.2% 
 
The simulations do indeed generate a consistently negative performance gap. The size of 
this gap is not of central interest here, since it is driven by our choice of w. Instead, our key interest 
is in the accuracy of our result that when the decomposition by initially sets monthly returns equal 
to the sample mean return it will mistakenly attribute around one third of the performance gap to 
bad investor timing. 
For investment horizons of only one or two years rather more than one third of the 
performance gap is attributed to bad timing, but any performance measures estimated over such a 
short time horizons are likely to be very noisy. The horizons considered by typical investors are 
likely to be longer than this, and for these (between 4 and 16 years) we find that our conclusion 
that around one third of the observed performance gap will be spuriously attributed to bad timing 
is a fairly accurate estimate. Even in exceptionally volatile markets (monthly s.d.=8%) one third is 
likely to be an acceptable ready reckoner. For very long horizons second order effects appear to 
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become more significant, implying that the spurious timing effect will account for less than one 
third of the measured performance gap. 
These simulations are consistent with the result derived in Section 3: that decomposing the 
performance gap using the sample mean gives rise to a spurious timing effect equal to around one 
third of the performance gap.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
A large number of papers have used the “performance gap” between the IRR and GM returns as 
an estimate of the effect that the timing of investment flows has had on the returns earned by 
investors. These suggest that bad timing has substantially reduced investor returns.  
Academic studies are typically been skeptical of claims that it is easy to generate consistent 
outperformance by predicting market returns. By contrast, studies based on performance gaps have 
been surprisingly willing to conclude that large groups of investors have consistently generated 
very substantial negative alpha entirely by accident (since investors were presumably not trying to 
time their investment flows badly). 
Hayley (2014) demonstrated that a misleading hindsight effect is inherent in the 
performance gap when investors chase returns. Vicente and Muňoz (2018) investigated the 
performance gap for US domestic equity mutual funds and argued that even after correcting for 
this hindsight effect, bad timing had significantly reduced investor returns. However, as 
demonstrated above, the assumptions used in their decomposition should be expected to lead to 
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around one third of the performance gap being misclassified as bad timing. This would account for 
the large majority of their estimated bad timing effect, leaving very little evidence of actual bad 
timing. This is an important result, since the apparent bad timing effect was economically 
significant.  
However, the contribution of this paper is not just to correct this particular finding, but also 
to offer a methodological improvement: a more robust method for interpreting performance gap 
data, taking appropriate account of the hindsight effect and also the bias resulting from using the 
sample GM return in the decomposition. This will allow future studies to derive more accurate 
estimates of the genuine effects of the timing of investment flows. 
We know that investor flows can be driven by entirely spurious data (e.g. Phillips et al., 
2012) showed that investor flows into mutual funds increase when the latest annual return rises 
purely because a significant monthly loss one year ago had dropped out of this calculation of this 
annual return. This is entirely spurious, since this effect is predictable and gives no new information 
on the skill of the managers concerned. This suggests that we should be concerned that investors 
will be similarly responsive to entirely spurious data on the “performance gap” (defined as IRR-
GM) that similarly has no relevance to the fund manager’s skill. It is likely to be very difficult to 
remove predictable behavioural biases from investors allocation of their savings, but we should at 
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Annex: Estimating the Hindsight Effect  
Above we considered substituting in rn during the decomposition of the performance gap to 
replicate the process of identifying the timing component of the gap. Now we look at the effect of 
substituting in an to derive the corresponding hindsight effect. We start with a version of equation 
(12), with rn already set to its actual value, and future values set to ̅ :  
IRR	
∑ 1 ∑ 	 1 ∑ ∑ ̅




1 	 1 ̅ 2
1
1 	 1 T n 1  
We then substitute in an. The numerator changes by	 ̅ and the denominator 
changes by an(T-n): 
IRR	
∑ 1 ∑ 	 1 ∑ ∑ ̅ ̅




1 	 1 ̅ ̅ 2
1





1 	 1 T n 1
1 	 1 ̅ ̅  
Noting that E[anan-j]=0: 
E dIRR 	 E ̅ 1 ̅  
									 E 1  
	 E 1  







	E dIRR 			for	large	T, consistent with equations (10) and (23) for the overall 
performance gap and timing effect respectively. 
 
